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This paper provides an approximation to the measurement of public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions. By 
using data from the European Community Household Panel, it is shown that the balance between what private 
firms pay in the local market and what the public sector pays, differs substantially in different areas of the 
country. Public sector wage differences among Spanish regions are mostly due to differences in returns, not to 
differences in characteristics or to selection effects, and are not constant across gender, educational levels, or 
occupations. Moreover, in those regions where Regional Governments have a higher weight in public 
employment, public wage gaps are higher and public employers pay higher returns. There also seems to be a 
cross-regional positive correlation between public wage gaps and unemployment, and a negative one between 
labour productivity and public wage gaps. Hence, a tentative conclusion is that the incentives to select into the 
public sector are higher in the low productivity regions, precisely those where scarcity of human capital in the 
private sector may be the most important factor for explaining economic backwardness. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In Spain one out of every five employees, one out of every four female employees, and about 
one out of every three employees with a university degree work for the public sector (see Table 
1).  Despite the high incidence of public sector employment, there is a lack of studies 
identifying the impact of the public sector segment of the labour market onto the private one. 
For instance, the voluminous empirical literature estimating gaps between wages in the public 
and private sectors has only a few entries for Spain.
1  
 
Public sector wage gaps are relevant in many dimensions. First, regarding fiscal policy, public 
wages constitute the main bulk of government consumption. Secondly, work organisations in 
the public sector differ in many senses from the private sector, as stressed by the literature on 
incentives in public organisations.
2 Because of the relatively higher strength of trade unions in 
the public sector and also due to incentive/equity considerations, wage structures use to be less 
unequal in the public sector. In this regard, the study of the wage structure in the public sector 
provides evidence on the institutional factors determining the pay practices of public 
employers. Thirdly, as skilled biased technological progress, international integration and 
changes in labour supply patterns are very much affecting the wage structure of the private 
sector, there are also reasons to believe that the wage structure is also changing in the public 
sector. Fourthly, there could be spill-over effects from public wages to private wages. Apart 
from “demonstrations effects”, wages and employment conditions in the public sector affect 
labour supply to the private sector, and, hence, to the composition of employment and wages 
that prevail in the private sector. For instance, if the public sector pays above the private sector 
the latter may feel compelled to raise the rates it pays certain types of labour to match those 
offered in the public sector. The resulting higher private sector costs lower competitiveness of 
the traded goods sector in the regions where public sector wage gaps are higher. Thus, if in a 
particular region incentives to select into public employment are particularly intense, then there 
could be a lack of human capital in the private sector lowering regional competitiveness and 
growth.  
 
In this paper we estimate public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions. Cross-regional wage 
inequality within the public sector is typically lower than in the private sector. Hence, public 
sector wage gaps ought to be higher in those sectors where private sector wages are lower. The 
Spanish labour market provides a very interesting case study for the issues at hand when 
discussing the consequences of the public sector for regional labour markets and, in particular, 
the impact of the public sector employment practices onto regional development. A tentative 
list of reasons is the following: 
  
•  First, besides the scope of the segment of the public sector labour market, Spain is one 
of the countries where there are typically several hundred, even thousands, applicants for each 
                                                 
1 As for the international literature see, for instance, Gregory and Borland (1999) for a survey, Borjas (2002) for 
the US experience, and Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for analysis of public sector wage gaps in Great Britain, Italy 
and France. A recent reference for Spain is Albert et al. (1999). 
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public sector job in offer, while in some occupations employers in the private sector find it 
difficult to hire new workers.  
 
•  Secondly, there are noticeable and persistent regional differences in the Spanish labour 
markets. Employment and unemployment rates, the incidence of “atypical” (i.e., temporary, 
seasonal, part-time) employment, wages, and other employment conditions differ significantly 
across Spanish regions.
3 In spite of these differences, there is not much mobility across regions, 
although intraregional labour mobility has noticeably increased along the 1990s.
4  
 
•  Thirdly, Spain has a quasi-federal structure with a continuously increasing weight of 
regional and local governments. After the transition to a democratic regime in the late 1970s, a 
process of political devolution, that is not yet completely resolved, produced a significant 
transfer of human resources from the Central Administration to Regional Governments and 
Local Corporations.  While the wages and employment conditions of Central Administration’s 
employees do not typically change across Spanish regions, Regional Governments and Local 
Corporations can introduce some differences in wage and employment conditions of their 
employees. This, together with the previous point, suggests that there is significant cross-
regional variability in wage and other employment conditions of public sector employees. 
 
•  Finally, along the 1980s and 1990s there had been some relevant changes in the 
institutional configuration of the labour market, mostly affecting to the private sector but also 
with some consequences for the public sector. As a result of these changes, there could be 
expected significant shifts in the wage structures of both sectors, on top of the shifts which 
conceivably could have been produced by the usual suspects in the literature regarding the 
evolution of wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s (biased-technological progress, 
international trade, changes in the composition of labour supply, etc.)  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional framework of the 
public and private labour markets in Spain, highlighting some recent reforms which have 
resulted, first, in a large increase of temporary employment in the private sector during the 
1980s and early 1990s, and, then some decrease in the private sector and a rise in the public 
sector of that kind of employment after the mid-1990s. It also provides a first comparison of 
wages in the public and private sectors in Spanish regions using average data from National 
Accounts and the administrative registers of public employees, and some information about the 
regional variation of the composition of employment across regions to qualify, in some 
dimensions, the sizes of the gaps. Section 3 describes the data, taken from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP, henceforth), and the estimation procedure used in our 
microeconometric analysis of regional public sector wage gaps. Section 4 presents our main 
results, showing that the balance between what private firms and what the public sector pay in 
the local markets, differs substantially in several areas of Spain so that, after controlling for 
individual characteristics and sorting of workers into sectors, public sector wages relative to 
private sector wages increase with unemployment and decreases with labour productivity 
across Spanish regions. We also find that the higher the weight in public employment of 
regional governments is, the higher public sector wage gaps are. Finally, Section 5 contains 
some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
3 See Bentolila and Jimeno (1998). 
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2.  Institutional framework of the Spanish labour market 
 
This section provides institutional details of the pay-setting arrangements in the public and 
private sectors in Spain, focusing in particular on the degree of centralisation and 
decentralisation in these arrangements and in recent labour market reforms that have changed 
the incidence of permanent employment. It also presents descriptive statistics of ‘raw’, 
unadjusted, regional pay differentials in the public and private sectors, according to 
information from National Accounts and administrative registers of public employees. The 
regional variation of these statistics is put into perspective by offering also some analysis of the 
regional variation in the composition of public employment along several dimensions such as 
age groups, gender, educational attainments and employment status.   
 
2.1.  The public sector 
 
In Spain the employment conditions of public sector employees may be regulated either by 
administrative legislation or by the labour legislation. The employment conditions of civil 
servants (funcionarios) are regulated by administrative legislation. Access to employment is by 
public and open examinations, and civil servants enjoy full employment security. Their wages 
are determined by the corresponding employer, which may be the Central Administration, 
Regional Governments and Local Corporations. There are several components of civil 
servants’ wages depending on the occupational level (5 groups ranked by the educational 
attainment level required for the post), job position (30 categories), remuneration for special 
dedication, ability, responsibility or  risk (up to 150 categories), seniority, productivity, and 
compensation for extraordinary services, working overtime, or special working time schedules. 
Civil servants working for the Central Administration receive the same wage package 
regardless of the region of residence. However, Regional Governments and Local Corporations 
have some flexibility at adjusting the remuneration of civil servants working for them. 
Although there are informal negotiations with trade unions and employees representatives, 
formal collective bargaining agreements are not in effect and changes in the employment 
conditions are implemented by changes in the corresponding administrative legislation. 
 
There is a second class of public sector employees, named personal laboral, whose 
employment conditions are determined by the same labour legislation which applies to 
employees in the private sector, and that we sketch in the next section. In this case, 
employment conditions are determined by formal collective bargaining, and the proportion of 
this type of public sector employees may differ depending on the characteristics of the public 
sector employer, not only on its geographical scope (Central Administration, Regional 
Governments, etc) but also on the activity being provided (health, teaching, etc.)  
 
It is also important to note that the distribution of government functions among the Central 
Administration, Regional Governments and Local Corporations have dramatically changed in 
the last two decades. From a situation in which the Central Administration was in charge of 
almost all public services, nowadays there are several services which are completely 
transferred to Regional Governments and Local Corporations. For instance, the provision of 
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governments.
5 This leads us to pay a particular attention to these two sectors below in our 
microeconometric analysis of public sector wage gaps. 
 
2.2 The private sector  
 
The employment conditions at the private sector of the Spanish labour market are mostly 
determined through collective bargaining between employers and employees representatives. 
Negotiations take place at different levels (nations, sector of activity, firm, plant) and the 
coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements are above 80%, although only about 15% of 
employees are covered by a firm-level collective agreement. The main law regulating 
collective bargaining was passed in 1980. Since the mid-1980s, there have been very few 
changes regarding the structure and contents of the Spanish collective bargaining system. 
 
Besides the regulation of collective bargaining, the Spanish labour law is very stringent 
regarding Employment Protection Legislation. The usual indicators of EPL strictness rank 
Spain at the top of OECD countries regarding firing restrictions of permanent employees. In 
this respect, labour market reforms since the early 1980s have been addressed at changing the 
nature and incidence of “atypical” employment contracts (fixed-term, temporary, part-time). In 
1984, fixed-term contracts were promoted by allowing firms to hire employees under this type 
of contracts for any kind of job, seasonal or not. Very soon, the proportion of employees with 
fixed-term employment contracts surpassed 30% and the proportion of new hires under this 
type of contract was about 95%. In the 1990s, several reforms have tried to reduce the scope of 
temporary employment. In 1994 the reasons for “fair dismissals” were widened, while in 1997 
a new permanent contract with lower firing costs for objective dismissals was put in place.
6  
 
Both the regulation of collective bargaining and EPL provisions apply to private sector 
employees and to public sector employees who are not civil servants, that is, who are hired 
under the labour code. After the EPL reforms of the 1990s, the proportion of employees with 
fixed-term contracts have diminished in the private sector (by about  6 p.p. since the mid 
1990s) but have increased in the public sector (by 5 p.p. in the same time period). While the 
reduction of fixed-term employment in the private sector is though to be related to the lowering 
of non-wage labour costs under permanent contracts implied by the reforms
7, the rise of 
temporary employment in the public sector is thought to be related to the higher incidence of 
subsidised employment in the public sector, as a form of Active Labour Market Policies, and 
further restrictions for hiring civil servants due to budgetary reasons.
8 
 
2.3. Public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions: Some preliminary comparisons 
 
The distribution of public employment at the three layers (Central Administration, Regional 
Governments and Local Corporations) at each Spanish region is plotted in Figure 1.
9 As can be 
seen, there are noticeable differences in the structure of public employment in Spanish regions. 
Not surprisingly, in Madrid the Central Administration employs about 45% of public 
                                                 
5 There is more discussion of the composition of public employment at the regional level in Section 2.3. 
6 There are many papers documenting and analysing temporary employment in Spain. See, for instance, Dolado et 
al. (2002) for a survey. 
7 Kugler et al. (2004) 
8 Dolado et al. (2002) 
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employees. In contrast, Regional Governments and Local Corporations account for the largest 
bulk of public employment (75% or higher) in most of the rest of the country.  
 
Regional wage differences in Spain are noticeable and persistent. Average compensation per 
employee in 2002 ranged from about 20.300 euros/year in Extremadura to more than 29.000 
euros/year in the Basque Country (see Table 2). Furthermore, there are no signs of 
convergence across regions in this regard. As a first approximation to measuring public sector 
wage gaps in Spanish regions, we rely on National Accounts data. We compare average 
compensation per employee in the non-market sector of the economy (mostly, the public 
sector) to the same variable in the market sector (mostly, the private sector).  Within the former 
we consider four branches: education, health and social services, non-market services, and 
public administration.  
 
As seen in Figure 2, there is a wide regional variation in public wages gap defined along these 
lines. In education the gap between average compensation per employee between the non-
market and the market sector ranges from 0.92 in the Valencian Community to about 1.7 in 
Navarra; in health and social services it ranges from 1.2 in Catalonia to about 2 in 
Extremadura. Wages gaps between the non-market and market service sectors range from 0.69 
in Madrid to about 1.09 in Canary Islands, while for compensation per employee in Public 
Administration relative to total compensation per employee (excluding the non-market sector) 
the range is between 0.73 in Madrid and 1.3 in the Basque Country.
10  
 
Another relevant fact of the evolution of public employment over the recent years is the rapid 
expansion of temporary employment, whose incidence in the public sector was about 16% in 
the mid-1990s and is nowadays above 22%.  This rise was mainly due to the increasing use of 
temporary contracts by Regional Governments and Local Corporations, although the 
proportion of fixed-term public employees also increased in Central Administrations. As 
already mentioned, budget restrictions imposed by fiscal consolidation and the widespread use 
of short-term contracts in programmes associated to Active Labour Market Policies seem to 
explain such a development (Dolado et al. 2002).  There are also wide differences in the 
incidence of temporary employment across population groups (by age, gender and skills), 
regions and sectors of activity. And there is empirical evidence of a relatively stable wage gap 
of about 9% between permanent and temporary workers (once individual characteristics and 
job attributes are controlled for).
11 Given the heterogeneous composition of public employment 
and the different selection effects which may be present at the regional level, the comparison of 
average wage gaps across regions is not very informative. As an illustration, we have estimated 
the probability of having a temporary contract in the public sector (conditional on working for 
the public sector). The sample is from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 




The results are in Table 3. As can be seen, even after controlling for individual characteristics 
some regional differences remain. In Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands, Castilla-La Mancha. 
Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, Navarra and the Basque Country 
temporary employment is more prevalent within the public sector. To some extent this 
                                                 
10 All these values refer to the mean throughout the period 1995-2001. 
11 See, for instance, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) de la Rica (2004) and Davia and Hernanz (2004). 
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resembles regional differences in temporary employment in the private sector, where 
Andalusia, Aragon, Castilla and León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia and Murcia 
are the regions with a higher proportion of temporary employees.
13  
 




The analysis of the Spanish wage structure is hindered by lack of appropriate data. The 
structural wage survey collected by the Statistical Office (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial) 
only covers the private sector and is only for 1995 and 2001. The Labour Force Survey does 
not collect information on wages. Hence, for information on wages of public sector employees, 
we are left with occasional surveys, which give information not comparable, neither across 
time nor across units. The only statistical source that provides some microeconomic 
information on this matter is the European Community Household Panel survey (ECPH). The 
ECHP is based on a survey that is annually carried out on a sample of households. It has a 
panel dimension so it allows us to follow the labour market performance of individuals through 
time. Individual characteristics, employment status and economic variables are obtained 
together with some characteristics of the household. Most of the variables describe the 
individual’s and household’s situation at the moment of the interview or refer to the current 
month of the interview. However, some variables related to individual and household annual 
earnings refer to the previous year.  Another important feature of the survey is that individuals 
are requested to indicate labour earnings, among other income sources. 
 
For the sake of this analysis, this data set has some advantages (comparability across countries, 
sufficient information on individual, family and job characteristics, a panel structure, etc.) and 
one main disadvantage, a small sample size, which prevents from estimating public wage gaps 
with a high degree of precision.
14  
 
Thus, we use the European Community Household Panel survey (ECPH) from 1995 to 2001 to 
estimate characteristics-adjusted public sector wage gaps. Wages are measured in real terms 
and in an hourly basis (using the CPI to deflate nominal monthly earnings provided by the 
ECHP and normal working hours to convert monthly earnings into hourly wages), and are 
expressed in euros (at constant prices, 2000). 
 
We start off by taking a look at the main sample characteristics of our data for public and 
private sector workers. Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics of our sample. Level of 
studies  consists of three dummy variables that classify the levels of studies as university, 
secondary, and primary education. Gender is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
worker is male; Marital Status takes value one if the worker is married and zero otherwise; 
other unemployment experience takes value one if, before the previous job, the individual 
experienced a spell of unemployment; Tenure in the previous job is measured in years and has 
been divided into four categories. The sample has roughly a similar percentage of public 
employees as the LFS, with women having a higher weight in public employment than in 
                                                 
13 García-Pérez and Rebollo (2004) find that regional differences in labour costs and in productivity explain the 
largest bulk of the regional differences in the incidence of temporary employment. 
14 Also, unfortunately, the survey does not provide information on the characteristics of the public employer 
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private employment, and public employees being relatively more educated, with longer tenure, 
and occupying professional positions. As for regions, public employment has an incidence 
above the average in Andalusia, Aragón, Asturias Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura. 
Hourly wages are about 44% higher in the public sector, on average. This is the result of three 
factors: i) higher earnings in the public sector, ii) longer working hours in the private sector, 
and iii) an employment composition of public employment characterised by more educated, 
longer tenured workers, and professionals. The hourly wage gap is even higher for women, and 
for employees in Andalusia, Cantabria, Galicia and the Canary Islands.  
 
Finally, Table 5 shows some interesting facts regarding how public sector wage gaps depend 
on the characteristics of the public employer. In this regard, the best examples are the health 
and the education systems, whose management was transferred from the Central 
Administration to Regional Governments in all the regions but at the different moment in time. 
Thus, whereas there are some regions which have this competence since the early eighties, 
others have only acquired it at the end of the nineties. In Table 5 it is shown that those regions 
which had these competences for a longer period show, in average, larger wage gaps between 
the public and the private sectors, both in health and education. Moreover, in the case of 
education, public sector wage gaps noticeably increased after competences were transferred 
from Central Administration to Regional Governments.  
 
3.2. Model Specification 
 
Pay differentials between the public and the private sectors have been traditionally measured 
by estimating earnings/wage equations (see Mincer, 1974) using microeconomic databases. 
However, since some individual and job characteristics are not observed, an omitted variable 
bias is likely to be present in the estimation of Mincerian equations. Another bias which can 
arise in the estimation of these equations is the well known self-selection bias, arising form the 
fact that the employment status of a given individual depends on variables which also affect 
wages.  
 
To eliminate the selectivity bias, we follow the traditional approach. We specify the probability 
of an individual being in a certain employment status as a function of individual characteristics. 
This probability acts as the selection equation in a Switching Regression Model for wages in 
both the public and the private sector. In this framework, the source of endogeneity is the 
existence of unobservable variables that could be correlated with the observable and non-
observable characteristics in the wage equation and that simultaneously influence the 
likelihood of a given worker being in the public sector.
15 
 
We consider a situation where for each sampled observation only one among the two 
dependent variables Wj – wages– is observed. Specifically, the observations on our dependent 
variable can be classified into two regimes, public and private sector respectively, which are 
generated by different probability laws: 
 
(1)  jj j j WX u β =+ , j=1,2         ( 1 )    
(2)   
                                                 
15 Other papers applying this methodology to different aspects in the field of labor studies are, for example,  







http://www.upo.es/econ   9
where Wj represents potential wages for a worker in state 1 (public sector) or 0 (private sector), 
Xj is the set of observable determinants of wages and uj represents the unobservable component 
of wages, which are assumed to be normal with variance 
2
j u σ . The selection mechanism is 
described through a latent variable model that describes the propensity towards being in one of 
the two possible states. As it is common in the latent variable approach, it is not possible to 
observe I
*,











          ( 2 )  
(4)   
that is, the worker will be observed in one state if the total value associated with this state is 
greater than the value in every other possible state. The latent variable model may be 
interpreted as a reduced form approach, where supply and demand side effects mix and cannot 
be disentangled. This implies that the behaviour of the worker and the functioning of the labour 
market jointly generate what we observe, I. The estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables therefore capture the joint effect of genuine preferences of the worker and the 
employer’s preferences as regards the worker’s characteristics. And therefore we have that: 
 
(5)  1 WW = ,  if  
* 0 I >          ( 3 )  
(6)  2 WW = ,  if  
* 0 I ≤  
(7)       
We assume that Ij depends on observable and unobservable variables:  
(8)   
(9) 
* IZ γ ε =+           ( 4 )  
 
where  Z represents a vector of individual specific explanatory variables that describes the 
determinants of the selection process, γ is the corresponding vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated and ε is the random component of the selection equation. This equation can be 
easily estimated using a probit specification. The basic assumption in this model is that the 
error terms in both the wage and the selection equations may be correlated (the correlation 
coefficients between these two elements are denoted, respectively, by
12  and  uu ε ε ρ ρ ). 
 
Given the fact that we are interested in estimating jointly the wage equations and the selection 
process, the likelihood function has to add the information relative to the wage process and to 
take account of the endogeneity of the selection process. We estimate the endogenous 
switching model by full maximum likelihood
16 because this method is more efficient than the 
two step estimation method proposed by Heckman (1979).
17 The likelihood function to be 
estimated has the following form: 
 
 
                                                 
16 An alternative is to estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood. However, difficulty is usually 
encountered in the estimation of both mean equation and covariance parameters. 
17 The two-step estimators are never fully efficient in the sense that they never attain the Cramer-Rao lower 
bound. The efficient estimator is the full information maximum likelihood, which estimates the earnings and type 
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 (5)  
(10)   
 
where the term ϕ(Wj) describes the density function of wages (j=1,2) and Φ(I*/Wj) the 
cumulative distribution function of the selection process conditional on wages.   
 
To test for the endogeneity of the switching model, the parameters of interest are the 
correlation coefficients between the error term of each wage equation and the error term of the 
selection equation.  If these parameters are different from zero, then the selection process is not 
exogenous and the estimation of the wage equations by OLS would give inconsistent 
estimators of the parameters of the model.  
 
From the estimation of this model we obtain unconditional and conditional wage predictions. 
The unconditional prediction is defined as the average predicted wage for all individuals in the 
sample. The conditional wage prediction represents the mean predicted wage for each worker 
type. Thus, we have: 
 
(11)  () ( )
()










       ( 6 )  
(12)  () ( )
()












      (6’) 
 
These are the equations underlying our estimation of public sector wage gaps in Spanish 
regions. We will also use them to breakdown total wage differences in differences in returns, 





4.1. Wage regressions 
 
We perform estimation of the previous model on five different samples: all workers, males, 
females, and workers in the education sector and in the health and social service sector, 
separately. The dependent variable is the log of hourly gross wage.
19 As co-variates, we 
introduce individual characteristics, such as gender, age, tenure, occupation, marital status and 




                                                 
18 An alternative to identify “pure” public sector wage gaps would be to focus on “movers”, that is individual 
changing jobs from the public to the private sector and viceversa. However, in our sample the proportion of 
movers is too low (3.1% from the private to the public sector and 10.0% from the public sector to the private 
sector) as to allow for estimation of regional public sector wage gaps.  
19 There are about 7% of moonlighters in our sample (4.58% of public employees and 2.44% of private 
employees). For the definition of employment status, we have used the declared main job, while the hourly wage 
also corresponds to the main job. 
20 We have not considered to introducing some kind of regional dependence across the parameters for each region, 
as, for instance, in a Geographically Weighted Regression. This technique weights each observation depending 
upon the points in space where the parameter estimates are expected to have more influence on the dependent 
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Regarding the selection equation, we need some identifying assumption, as that implied by 
some variable affecting the propensity of being in the public sector, but not wages. For this, we 
have used two types of variables. First, we thought of the spouse’s level of education and 
sector of affiliation as one important determinant of the propensity of being in the public 
sector. Secondly, we explore the idea that individuals in the public sector are likely to have a 
lower time discount rate and higher capital income. The justification for this is that, being entry 
into the public sector regulated through public examinations which typically involve several 
years of preparation, individuals who discount less the future and those who do not have 
financial constrains, are more likely to be in the public sector. Thus, we use the savings rate 
and capital income, as proxies of the time discount rate and of financial constraints, to 
predicting the likelihood of working in the public sector.
22  
 
The estimation results are compiled in Appendix A, and are briefly summarised in what 
follows. Beginning with the selection equation for the full sample, females, singles, and those 
with a university degree are more likely to work in the public sector. The variables identifying 
the selection into the public sector (education level and employment status of the spouse, the 
saving rate, and capital income) are all statistically significant; especially noteworthy is that 
those individuals with the spouse working in the public sector are the most likely to work also 
in this sector. 
 
With respect to the wage equations, we find that the difference between males and females is 
larger in the private than in the public sector, where the gender gap is below 10% after 
controlling for observable characteristics.
23 Returns to education are larger in the public sector, 
especially for those with a university degree.
24 Also, the returns to a permanent contract are 
higher in the public sector. With respect to the household type, we find larger wages for 
married workers with children, both in the public and in the private sector. Finally, selection 
into both sectors seems to be driven by horizontal distribution of abilities. Since 
1 u ε ρ is 
estimated to be negative, the mean wage of public workers is higher compared to the mean 
wage that a randomly selected group of the population would have earned, were they employed 
in the public sector. Similarly, since 
2 u ε ρ is estimated to be negative, the mean wage of private 
workers is lower (see equation 6’) compared to the mean wage that a randomly selected group 
                                                                                                                                                          
variable that observations further away. In principle, labour mobility in response to wage differentials (both in the 
public and private sector) could imply some geographical dependence among the parameters of each region. But, 
a priori, it is quite difficult to anticipate the main patterns of this dependence as to impose it in the estimation 
procedure. 
21 We have also estimated alternative specifications with other co-variates, such as interaction terms between 
tenure and education, and tenure and type of contracts, without significant changes in the regional dummies we 
are interested in. 
22 As most identifying assumptions, these are not uncontroversial. The main problem is that we observe spouse 
characteristics and saving rates and capital income, not at the moment of joining either the public or the private 
sector, but at the current date. However, these variables are statistically significant for explaining the probability 
of being employed in the public sector, and the estimates of the wage equation do not qualitatively change when 
some of them are dropped from the selection equation.  
23 The same is obtained in Albert et al. (1999). 
24 Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1987) find the opposite result for a developing country. In the case of Spain, the 
main source of differences in the returns to a university degree between the public and the private sectors apply to 
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of the population would have earned, were they employed in the private sector. Below we 
correct for these sorting effects when estimating public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions.  
 
As for regional differences, all the regions, but one (the Basque Country), have lower wages in 
the public sector than Madrid. While, relative to Madrid, Ballearic Islands, Canary Islands, 
Castilla and León, Catalonia, and Navarra do not display statistically significant different 
wages in the public sector, Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Valencian Community, 
and, especially, Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, and La Rioja, have lower wages in the public 
sector. In contrast, in the private sector, wages in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarra 




Also noteworthy are the cross-regional differences in wage structures between sectors. Overall, 
managers, professionals, and clerks are relatively better paid in the private sector, whereas 
semi-skilled workers receive relatively better wages in the public sector. There are larger 
returns to a university degree in the public sector in the Center and in the Southern regions, 
while Clerks, Professionals and Semi-skilled workers have relatively higher returns outside the 
Center regions in the public sector, but not in the private sector. On the contrary, the private 
sector in the Center regions is the one with better wages for managers and professionals.  
 
Regarding the returns to individual characteristics from separate estimation of wage equations 
for males and females, the most noteworthy result is that returns to education and to tenure are 
higher for women than for men in the public sector. Other than that, we continue finding the 
main features obtained with the whole sample. As for regional differences, they are larger for 
women than for men, both in the public and in the private sectors.  Finally, the correlation 
coefficients of non-observables in both groups show some interesting differences: although 
both coefficients are negative, the one for the public sector is more negative for males than for 
females, what shows that the negative self-selection into the public sector is more important for 
males than for females.  
 
We are particularly interested on regional public sector wage gaps in two particular 
occupations (teaching and health and social services) with a significant presence both in the 
public sector and in the private sector. As commented in Section 2, within the public sector, 
during the sample period these activities were to some extent transferred to Regional 
Governments and, hence, they are those where the scope for regional differentiation of wages 
is wider. We offer a separate estimation of our switching model for these two categories of 
workers. As for the teaching sector we find that the gender wage gap is not statistically 
significant in the public sector where it is about 11%, higher for men, in the private sector. 
Returns to education and to a permanent contract are higher in the public sector. Interestingly, 
in most regions wage in the public sector are higher than in Madrid, while it happens the 
contrary in the private sector. Finally, in the Health and Social Services sector we find a 
positive wage gap for males in both sectors.
26 Moreover, the returns to tenure and to a 
permanent contract are lower in this sector for public workers. We find no regional differences 
for these workers both in the public and the private sector. 
 
                                                 
25 With the EHCP data, Ceuta and Melilla are included into Andalusia. 
26 For this case, it is not possible to include all regional dummies due to sample size problems. Thus, we group all 







http://www.upo.es/econ   13
To confirm whether the wage gaps estimated with a switching regression model are robust to 
specification issues, we also consider the results from an alternative estimation of wage gaps 
using a random effects approach (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Under this specification, the 
effects of all regressors are almost unchanged. Hence, the estimated wage gap and the 
breakdown between differences in characteristics and differences in returns are more or less the 
same under both approaches. 
 
We are also interested in whether the wage gaps between public and private sector workers are 
different depending on the level of the wage. That is, we want to observe gaps at different 
segments of the wage distribution, since it can be expected some smoothing of returns and of 
wage differences within the public sector. Hence, we have carried out three quartile 
regressions, at the 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles, in order to verify this hypothesis. The results 
from these regressions are shown in the Appendix (Tables B2-B4 in Appendix B), while the 
corresponding regional differences are plotted in Figure 3. As expected, public sector wage 
gaps are lower in the top tale of the wage distribution (11% in the 75% quartile) than in the 
bottom one (21.3% in the 25% percentile). Moreover, when we estimate separately these 
quartiles for workers in the public and in the private sector, we obtain that males are better paid 
in the private sector, being this difference the biggest in the top quartile. With respect to 
education, its return increases over the wage distribution, especially for those with a university 
degree in the South and in Madrid, whereas these differences are almost zero in the rest of the 
country. Finally, there exist also some interesting regional differences in this regard. For the 
top quartile, the differences with respect to Madrid in the public sector are the biggest in the 
South, whereas in the private sector, the main difference with respect to Madrid arises in the 
Northern regions that seem to pay less than Madrid along the whole wage distribution.  
 
4.2. A summary of estimated public wage gaps in Spanish regions 
 
Given the wage regressions commented above, we break down public sector wage gaps in 
differences of characteristics, returns, self-selection, and perform some regional analysis of 
“adjusted” public sector wage gaps. We consider, respectively, the deterministic component of 
log-wages, and the deterministic component plus the conditional expectation of the stochastic 
component of log-wages, where the deterministic component is computed using the estimates 
from the joint estimation. Hence, with the decomposition of unconditional expectations we are 
applying the typical Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method to wage differentials adjusted for 
the selection bias (see Yun, 1999), so that it can be observed the main predictions of our 
switching regression model in terms of predicted conditional wages, both for public and private 
sector workers. The main results are reported in Table 6. 
 
According to our estimation results, the predicted conditional difference between public and 
private wages, in logs, is a bit larger (45.7%) than the observed statistical difference of wages 
between the public and the private sector (40.4%). This difference is due to the estimated 
negative effect of self-selection. Thus, the unobserved characteristics that make a given worker 
to be in the public sector will lower his expected conditional wage. On the contrary, non-
observables affect to private sector workers making their wages to be higher than for the mean 
worker. Hence, without considering that the sample of workers in each sector is not a random 
sample, we would underestimate the difference between working in the public and in the 
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Discounting sorting effects reduces significantly public sector wage gaps, as can be seen in the 
last column of Table 6. After this adjustment for sorting, the wage gap between public and 
private sector can be explained by differences in their characteristics, by about 51 percentage 
points, whereas only 21.1 percentage points is due to different in returns to specific 
characteristics. Very interesting results are obtained when we split our sample between males 
and females. Firstly, we have that the wage gap is much larger for females (59.1%) than for 
males (39.7%).
27 Moreover, we obtain a more significant effect of self-selection for males than 
for females. The former seem to suffer a more negative self-selection into the public sector that 
makes the real wage gap to be larger than when endogeneity is correctly taken into account. 
Women also suffer a negative self-selection into the public sector although the effect of self-
selection is smaller. 
 
The results for the samples of workers in the health and teaching sectors reflect that the self-
selection is even more negative in the first group whereas the effect for the latter group is less 
important. The wage gap in the sector of Health and Social Services is the lowest (all the 
observed difference is due to returns but it is completely compensated with a huge negative 
self-selection into the public sector). On the contrary, in the teaching sector the wage gap is 
more significant, being around 36.0%, because both the difference in returns and the self-
selection effect are smaller for these workers. 
 
Our main motivation for this exercise is to identifying differences between public and private 
sector wages across regions.
28 In the second panel of Table 6 we show that the biggest wage 
gap is observed in the Northern and Southern regions, and that these differences in wage gaps 
are mostly due to differences in returns. Differences in characteristics and in sorting effects of 
self-selection, particularly noticeable in the high wage regions, such as the Basque Country, 
Navarra, Madrid, and Catalonia, are also noticeable (see Figure 4).
29  The regions with the 
largest public sector wage gaps due to differences in returns are Cantabria, Galicia, Canary 
Islands, Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha, and Castilla and León. 
 
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 6 and Figure 5 show that the regional wage differences with 
respect to Madrid are lower in the public sector than in the private one, confirming our prior 
that the wage structure in the public sector is more compressed than in the private sector. This 
is particularly true for the Northern regions (Asturias, Cantabria, Galicia) and for the Canary 
and Ballearic Islands where the ratio between both differences is larger than 1.8, that is, 
whereas the public sector in the North pays 10% less than in Madrid, in the private sector, 
where productivity should be taken much more in consideration, this ratio is almost 18% 
lower. The same happens in the South (Castilla-La Mancha, Murcia and Andalusia), although 




                                                 
27 The same is obtained in Albert et al. (1999) where, for 1994, the first wave of the ECHP, these gaps are, 
respectively, 49.3% and 41.2%. In fact, public sector wage gaps for females seem to have increased during the last 
years of the Twentieth Century. 
28 We have checked that there are sufficient observations in each cell so that comparisons between public and 
private sector wages rely on estimates with a common support.  
29 The regions where the self-selection effect is more important are the ones with larger wages in the private sector 
(Catalonia, Navarra, the Basque Country and Madrid). Hence, in these regions public sector wage gaps are hided 
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4.3. Economic patterns in the cross-regional variation of public wage gaps 
 
Having broken down public sector wage gaps in different sources, we now search for some 
patterns in the cross-regional variation of public sector wage gaps.  We consider the total wage 
gap and the gap due to returns, being the latter the best measure of how the same skills are 
rewarded differentially in the public and private sectors. We relate these gaps to regional 
differences in the composition of public employment, labour productivity and unemployment. 
 
Previously, we have already noticed that with the transfer of public services from the Central 
Administration to Regional Governments, public wage gaps have tended to increase. Data 
plotted in Figure 6 suggest that there is indeed a positive correlation across regions between 
public sector wage gaps (both total and its component due to differences in returns) and the 
proportion of public employment under regional governments, although, admittedly, this 
correlation is somewhat blurred by three outliers (Extremadura, La Rioja and Navarra). This 
positive correlation can be interpreted in several ways. First, as stressed in the political 
economy literature, the closer the management of public employment to its political 
constituency is, the easier for public employees to extract rents is. Secondly, a lower fiscal 
responsibility of the regional governments could have softened their budget constraints, giving 
some leeway for additional wage increases for public employees. Finally, as public 
employment expands, public employers need to pay higher wages to attract more employees. 
Our conjecture is that all these three explanations play some role at explaining the correlation 
highlighted above. Unfortunately, with the data available we cannot attribute weights to each 
one of these hypothesis.  
 
Two important determinants of wages are productivity and unemployment. Higher productivity 
leads to higher wages both in the public and private sector, but, theoretically, to lower public 
wage gaps, insofar as public wages are conceivably less responsive to productivity. On the 
other hand, as stressed in the introduction, higher public wage gaps could create incentives for 
workers to enter into the public sector leaving less human capital available for the economic 
development of the private sector. In fact, Figure 7 shows that across Spanish regions there is a 
negative correlation between production per employee and public wage gaps, both regarding 
the total gaps and their component due to differences in returns.  
 
As for unemployment, there are several channels which could create a significant relationship 
with public wage gaps. Higher unemployment reduces workers’ reservation wages and, hence, 
tends to lower wages. Insofar as wages in the private sector are conceivably more affected by 
unemployment that public sector wages, a positive correlation between unemployment and 
public wage gaps should be expected. But there is an alternative explanation of this type of 
correlation, going from higher public wage gaps to higher taxes to financing public wages, and 
to lower employment creation in the private sector. In the Spanish case, as shown in Figure 8, 
there is a clear positive correlation between unemployment and public wage gaps (here the 
outliers seem to be Andalusia and Extremadura), regardless of whether the gap is measured by 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper provides a first approximation to the measurement of public sector wage gaps in 
Spanish regions. We believe that this exercise is informative in several respects. First, since 
public sector wages in Spain can be differentiated across regions mostly by the action of 
Regional Governments and Local Corporations, it provides some information about how the 
wage structure in the public sector may change depending upon the scope of the public 
employer. We have shown that there are indeed sizeable public sector wage differences among 
Spanish regions which are mostly due to differences in returns, and to a lesser extent to 
differences in characteristics and to selection effects.  
 
Secondly, we have also shown that the differences among regions are not constant across 
gender, educational levels, or occupations. In those regions where Regional Governments have 
a higher weight in public employment, public wage gaps are higher and public employers pay 
higher returns. Despite significant differences in public and private sector wages across 
regions, there is however no trend towards reduction of regional wage differences in Spain.  
 
Finally, we have also found a cross-regional positive correlation between public wage gaps and 
unemployment and a negative one between labour productivity and public wage gaps. 
Although, there are alternative explanations of these two findings which could only be tested 
with more detailed data, the evidence do not reject the view that pay setting in the public sector 
could be creating some barriers for regional development, being by adjusting to a less extent to 
economic factors diverging across regions or by creating incentives for the selection of human 
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Table 1. Proportion of public sector employees, Spain, 2004 
 






     
All  20.0%  9.0% 13.5% 35.4% 
Males  16.5%  8.3% 12.3% 29.7% 
Females  25.1% 10.4% 15.4% 41.4% 






Table 2: Average compensation per employee, 1995-2002 
 
   1995  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 2002
Andalusia  17,943 18,235 18,686 19,082 19,637 20,212 20,825 21,708
Aragon  20,002 21,204 21,515 22,149 22,939 23,728 24,560 25,431
Asturias  20,437 21,130 21,712 22,518 22,831 23,583 24,308 25,150
Balearic  Islands  20,108 21,167 22,012 22,379 22,973 23,658 24,418 25,558
Canary  Islands  19,380 20,107 20,475 20,800 21,083 21,890 22,638 23,743
Cantabria  20,116 21,083 21,830 22,738 23,566 24,155 25,089 25,915
Castille  and  León  18,843 20,158 20,547 21,294 22,138 23,148 23,968 24,800
Castille-La  Mancha  17,076 18,222 18,220 18,633 19,480 20,229 21,082 21,964
Catalonia  20,976 21,801 22,337 22,958 23,447 24,454 25,558 26,617
Comunidad  Valenciana  17,547 18,536 19,045 19,633 19,989 20,698 21,733 22,527
Extremadura  15,466 16,582 16,983 17,505 17,833 18,731 19,480 20,315
Galicia  17,114 18,439 18,834 19,312 19,845 20,377 21,183 22,149
Madrid  22,581 23,350 24,322 25,163 25,765 26,852 27,894 28,866
Murcia  16,393 17,386 17,490 17,829 18,379 19,325 20,280 21,167
Navarra  21,555 23,184 23,551 24,350 24,918 26,071 27,137 28,192
Basque  Country  23,153 24,224 24,881 25,648 26,452 27,387 28,273 29,285
La  Rioja  19,003 20,160 20,625 21,581 22,542 23,680 24,846 25,645
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 PUBLIC  SECTOR  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
              
Variables Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient  t-Stat. 
              
Male  -0.439 -8.71 -0.069 -2.74 
Secondary  Education  -0.289 -3.72 -0.135 -4.55 
University  Education  -0.400 -5.35 -0.187 -5.70 
Married -0.356  -4.56  0.036  1.03 
Number of children  0.031  1.09  -0.026  -1.85 
Age 0.004  0.19  -0.046  -6.13 
Age (square)  0.000  -1.28  0.000  4.01 
Big firm (+500 e.)  0.046  0.79  -0.326  -7.44 
Part-time job  0.325  2.94  0.489  11.09 
Tenure  -0.386 -28.38 -0.434 -63.11 
Tenure  (square)  0.014 21.77 0.018 55.42 
Managers 0.372  2.06  -0.803  -8.84 
Professionals 0.016  0.18  -0.524  -14.35 
Clerks -0.278  -2.82  -0.624  -13.49 
Semi-skilled workers  0.060  0.59  -0.294  -9.72 
Andalusia  0.308 3.19 1.172 3.41 
Aragón  0.159 1.27 0.923 2.12 
Asturias  0.599 4.71 0.877 1.97 
Ballearic  Islands  -0.068 -0.37 -1.075 -2.91 
Canary  Islands  0.291 2.63 0.223 0.72 
Cantabria  0.122 0.74 0.457 1.43 
Castilla y León  0.168  1.34  1.129  2.39 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.265 2.13 1.337 2.57 
Catalonia  -0.023 -0.20 -0.077 -0.14 
Comunidad  Valenciana  0.489 4.32 0.417 1.20 
Extremadura  0.578 4.80 1.479 2.37 
Galicia  0.238 2.02 0.924 2.26 
Murcia  0.375 2.79 1.044 2.85 
Navarra  0.301 2.18 1.045 1.49 
Basque  Country  0.617 4.76 1.002 1.84 
La Rioja  -0.400  -1.94  0.824  1.28 
Spouse with University Education  0.045  0.58  -0.211  -4.67 
Spouse with Secondary Education  0.061  0.74  -0.204  -5.02 
Spouse in the Public Sector  0.006  0.08  -0.120  -2.06 
Industry     -2.224  -0.72 
Construction     2.061  0.66 
Services     4.212  1.36 
Non profit services      -11.297  -2.31 
Constant term   1.262  3.40  1.320  0.53 
      
Number of observations  6.925    21.313   
Log likelihood =   -1,874.925    -8,804.115   
 
Note:  Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single, 











Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and mean hourly wages (in euros 2000) 
 
   PUBLIC SECTOR  PRIVATE SECTOR       
   % TOTAL  (log) WAGE   % TOTAL  (log) WAGE   WAGE GAP  # OBSERV. 
All  24.52% 2.23 75.48% 1.78  44.37%  28,238
Males  21.32% 2.24 78.68% 1.86  38.43%  18,201
Females  30.34% 2.21 69.66% 1.63  57.78%  10,037
Permanent  employment  contract  30.44% 2.32 69.56% 1.96  35.90%  18,417
Fixed-term  employment  contract 13.43% 1.85 86.57% 1.52  32.72%  9,821
tenure<=3  13.07% 1.91 86.93% 1.59  31.75%  11,955
tenure  3-15  28.61% 2.26 71.39% 1.86  39.18%  7,722
tenure>15  36.84% 2.37 63.16% 2.08  28.83%  8,561
Primary  studies  12.85% 1.91 87.15% 1.66  25.47%  13,525
Secondary  studies  22.98% 2.09 77.02% 1.81  27.78%  5,963
Tertiary  studies  43.62% 2.42 56.38% 2.06  35.81%  8,75
Andalusia  27.42% 2.17 72.58% 1.65  52.01%  3,545
Aragon  30.73% 2.25 69.27% 1.88  37.02%  1,292
Asturias  34.72% 2.26 65.28% 1.79  46.61%  844
Ballearic Islands  20.69% 2.25 79.31% 1.74  50.21%  759
Canary Islands  25.51% 2.18 74.49% 1.62  56.06%  1,776
Cantabria  25.03% 2.29 74.97% 1.68  61.45%  931
Castilla y León  25.94% 2.26 74.06% 1.78  48.05%  1,577
Castilla-La Mancha  27.51% 2.15 72.49% 1.64  51.12%  1,265
Catalonia  18.96% 2.32 81.04% 1.96  35.43%  3,212
Comunidad Valenciana  18.85% 2.16 81.15% 1.69  46.88%  2,419
Extremadura  34.50% 1.94 65.50% 1.63  30.96%  974
Galicia  25.47% 2.22 74.53% 1.57  65.35%  1,763
Madrid  25.80% 2.38 74.20% 2.01  36.16%  3,271
Murcia  23.87% 2.07 76.13% 1.59  48.41%  1,328
Navarra  24.24% 2.32 75.76% 1.91  41.02%  1,023
Basque Country  18.30% 2.41 81.70% 2.04  37.18%  1,519
La Rioja  17.03% 2.06 82.97% 1.82  23.93%  740
Managers  16.25% 2.64 83.75% 2.61  2.85%  714
Professionals  45.80% 2.38 54.20% 1.94  43.42%  9,604
Clerks  30.80% 2.01 69.20% 1.89  11.89%  3,149
Semi-skilled  workers  7.25%  2.02 92.75% 1.73  29.04%  10,34
Unskilled  workers  15.57% 1.72 84.43% 1.50  22.67%  4,431
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Table 5. Average wage gaps by region:  
Effect of having the competence on Health and Education 
 
   HEALTH EDUCATION 
   YEAR of 
transfer 













Andalusia  1984  16,0% 1982     51,8% 
Aragon 2002  2,3% 1998 35,4%  48,2% 
Asturias 2002  6,9% 1999 35,3%  60,4% 
Ballearic Islands  2002  26,5% 1997 58,5%  61,9% 
Canary Islands  1994  61,4% 1983     52,9% 
Cantabria 2002  45,4% 1998 28,6%  71,8% 
Castilla and León  2002  49,3% 1999 51,6%  58,5% 
Castilla-La Mancha  2002  23,5% 1999 71,1%  42,3% 
Catalonia  1981  15,1% 1980     30,7% 
Valencian Community  1987  38,6% 1983     34,0% 
Extremadura 2002  12,0% 1999 23,5%  38,2% 
Galicia  1990  36,3% 1982     50,5% 
Madrid 2002  21,0% 1999 16,0%  24,4% 
Murcia 2002  20,8% 1999 43,2%  55,3% 
Navarra  1990  33,6% 1990     27,9% 
Basque Country  1987  34,5% 1980     42,1% 
La Rioja  2002  2,4% 1998  18,7  56,5 
 
Note:  For the education sector, the year of the transfer refers to the year in which the non-university 
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Table 6. Breakdown of Public Sector Wage Gaps in Spanish Regions 
Public sector     
(in logs) 
Private sector   
(in logs) 
Total Wage 
Gap       
 Due to 
returns 
 Due to 
characteristics 
 Due to self-
selection 
 
Spain  2,24 1,78  45.7% 51.07% 21.12%  -26.51%   
Men 2,25  1,85  39.7%  60.24%  19.95%  -40.53%   
Women 2,21  1,62  59.1%  44.81%  28.11%  -13.83%   
Health 2,46  2,27  18.8%  53.84%  20.90%  -55.94%   
Teaching 2,49  2,13  35.7% 34.06% 15.04% -13.40%   













 Due to self-
selection 
 
Andalusia 2,17  1,70  47.1%  51.89%  14.47%  -19.22%   
Aragón 2,19  1,81  37.3%  47.25%  20.38%  -30.35%   
Asturias 2,29  1,75  54.1%  52.52%  21.19%  -19.65%   
Ballearic Islands  2,32  1,81  51.0%  51.04%  23.05%  -23.12%   
Canary Islands  2,27  1,69  57.5%  55.71%  17.97%  -16.17%   
Cantabria 2,28  1,66  62.2%  58.62%  17.60%  -14.00%   
Castilla and León  2,23  1,73  49.9%  54.64%  20.90%  -25.60%   
Castilla-La Mancha  2,18  1,67  51.7%  54.21%  14.48%  -16.99%   
Catalonia 2,34  1,92  41.7%  48.32%  31.62%  -38.27%   
Valencia 2,22  1,75  46.3%  50.11%  18.38%  -22.24%   
Extremadura 1,98  1,66  31.3%  44.02%  5.54%  -18.31%   
Galicia 2,18  1,59  59.3%  58.09%  9.71%  -8.51%   
Murcia 2,13  1,64  48.9%  51.94%  9.62%  -12.81%   
Navarra 2,32  1,93  39.0%  47.07%  32.64%  -40.69%   
Basque Country  2,41  1,95  46.0%  51.51%  40.18%  -45.72%   
La Rioja  2,11  1,79  31.7%  45.13%  19.18%  -32.62%   
Madrid 2,34  1,90  44.4%  47.04%  35.37%  -38.02%   
   Public sector   Private sector  Private sector/Public sector   
Andalusia vs Madrid  -16.04%  -18.41%  1.148         
Aragón vs Madrid  -14.31%  -8.08%  0.565         
Asturias vs Madrid  -5.28%  -13.92%  2.635         
Ballearic Islands vs 
Madrid  -2.31% -8.53% 3.701       
 
Canary Islands vs 
Madrid -7.20%  -18.71%  2.597       
 
Cantabria vs Madrid  -6.24%  -21.56%  3.452         
Castilla and León vs 
Madrid -10.57%  -15.42%  1.459       
 
Castilla-La Mancha vs 
Madrid  -14.79% -20.81% 1.407       
 
Catalonia vs Madrid  -0.29%  2.40%  -8.311         
Valencia vs Madrid  -11.91%  -13.62%  1.144         
Extremadura vs Madrid  -30.74%  -20.96%  0.682         
Galicia vs Madrid  -15.08%  -26.80%  1.777         
Murcia vs Madrid  -19.31%  -22.75%  1.178         
Navarra vs Madrid  -2.31%  3.14%  -1.364         
Basque Country vs 
Madrid  6.72% 5.09%  0.757       
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Appendix A: Estimated wage regressions 
Table A.1a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, full sample)  
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation (public sector) 
    Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat    Coef. t-stat 
Male 0.099  10.25  0.240  40.32  Male  -0.226  -12.14
Secondary  Education  0.110 2.84 0.121 6.08  Secondary  Education  0.389 5.53 
University Education  0.305  8.04  0.250  11.64  University Education  0.758  12.06 
Permanent Contract  0.187  14.51  0.140  20.24  Married  -0.176  -6.02 
Tenure 0.018  6.63  0.018  10.81  Number of children  0.016  1.53 
Tenure (square)  -0.001  -4.37  0.000  -3.91  Age  0.096  14.70 
Managers 0.644  6.92  0.694  15.33  Age  (square)  -0.001  -10.26
Professionals  0.199  3.73  0.345  12.48  Spouse with University   0.271  9.78 
Clerks  -0.058  -1.02  0.235  7.73  Spouse with Second. Educ.  0.154  5.50 
Semi-skilled workers  0.117  1.97  0.107  4.10  Spouse in the Public S.  0.375  11.62 
Married  0.051 4.12 0.039 5.02  Capital  Income  0.106 4.79 
Number  of  children  0.013 2.85 0.027 8.43  Saving  rate  -0.218  -1.26 
Age 0.009  2.27  0.029  15.52  Industry  -1.445  -0.61 
Age (square)  0.000  -1.71  0.000  -13.98  Construction  1.633  0.70 
North x Second. Edu.  -0.144  -2.85  -0.049  -1.74  Services  -0.222  -0.93 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.177  -3.76  0.001  0.05  Non profit services  5.130  1.41 
        x Managers  -0.074 -0.60 -0.121 -1.73  North x Second. Edu.  0.186  1.94 
        x Professionals  0.209  3.11  -0.197  -5.25          x Univers. Educ.  0.164  1.98 
        x Clerks  0.209  2.87  -0.031  -0.70  East x Second. Edu.  0.055  0.68 
        x Semi-skilled  0.122  1.67  -0.051  -1.52          x Univers. Educ.  0.224  3.18 
East x Second. Edu.  -0.111  -2.52  -0.029  -1.29  South x Second. Edu.  0.143  1.80 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.207  -5.03  -0.026  -1.09           x Univers. Educ.  0.243  3.48 
        x Managers  0.024  0.22  -0.128  -2.50  Constant term  -3.025  -1.57 
        x Professionals  0.175  2.91  -0.166  -5.37        
        x Clerks  0.158  2.43  -0.058  -1.66        
        x Semi-skilled  0.056  0.83  -0.049  -1.71  1 u σ   0.367 37.00 
South x Second. Edu.  -0.068  -1.60  -0.032  -1.37  2 u σ   0.380 171.37
         x Univers. Educ.  -0.071  -1.79  0.014  0.55  1 u ε ρ   -0.618 -13.69
         x Managers  -0.369 -3.45 -0.120 -2.12  2 u ε ρ   -0.304 -11.71
         x Professionals  0.077  1.36  -0.207  -6.68    
         x Clerks  0.149  2.39  -0.056  -1.59    
         x Semi-skilled  -0.061  -0.96  -0.036  -1.27  Number of obs =  28,238 
Constant term  6.738  57.61  5.758  143.89  Wald chi2(54) =  3,823.52 
           Prob > chi2 =  0 
           Log likelihood    -24,114    
                  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A.1b) included. The constant term represents a woman 
with primary education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an 
unskilled position. Regional aggregation: NORTH (GALICIA, ASTURIAS, CANTABRIA), EAST 
(PAIS VASCO,     COMUNIDAD FORAL DE NAVARRA, LA RIOJA, ARAGON, CATALONIA, 
COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA, BALLEARIC ISLANDS), CENTER (CASTILLA AND LEON, 
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Table A.1b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, full sample). 
Regional dummies 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
   Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia  -0.162 -3.06 -0.115 -4.48  -0.275 -1.06 
Aragon  -0.158 -2.77 0.004  0.14  -0.140 -0.41 
Asturias -0.121  -1.91  -0.066  -2.02  0.000  0.00 
Ballearic Islands  -0.090  -1.49  -0.023  -0.80  0.288  1.00 
Canary  Islands  -0.090 -1.67 -0.126 -4.78  -0.096 -0.40 
Cantabria  -0.115 -1.82 -0.153 -4.79  -0.103 -0.41 
Castilla y León  -0.083  -1.53  -0.076  -2.81  -0.372  -1.02 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.148 -2.72 -0.146 -5.27  -0.265 -0.66 
Catalonia -0.029  -0.52  0.105  4.01  0.008  0.02 
Comunidad  Valenciana  -0.142 -2.51 -0.061 -2.37  -0.066 -0.24 
Extremadura  -0.335 -6.14 -0.143 -5.00  -0.387 -0.84 
Galicia  -0.192 -3.09 -0.217 -6.98  -0.247 -0.78 
Murcia  -0.220 -4.03 -0.175  -6.5  -0.160 -0.56 
Navarra  -0.032 -0.55 0.117  4.12  -0.105 -0.19 
Basque Country  0.113  1.92  0.149  5.43  -0.447  -1.06 
La  Rioja  -0.189 -3.08 -0.006 -0.21  -0.421 -0.84 
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Table A.2a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, males) 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation (public sector) 
   Coef.  t-stat  Coef.  t-stat     Coef.  t-stat 
       
Second. Educ.  0,139  2,71 0,127 5,16Second. Educ.  0,328 3,65
University Educ.  0,231  5,00 0,268 10,34University Educ.  0,645 8,27
Permanent Contract  0,182  9,76 0,123 14,48Marital Status  -0,202 -5,28
Tenure 0,017  4,68 0,015 7,29Number of children  -0,006 -0,52
Tenure (square)  0,000  -3,08 0,000 -1,77Age  0,074 9,12
Managers 0,677  6,05 0,688 13,11Age  (square)  -0,001 -5,81
Professionals  0,270  3,79 0,320 8,53Spouse with University   0,330 9,65
Clerks  -0,058  -0,72 0,258 5,66Spouse with Second. Educ.  0,186 5,76
Semi-skilled workers  0,117  1,57 0,121 3,43Spouse in the Public S.  0,269 6,83
Marital Status  0,070  3,74 0,055 5,62Capital Income  0,082 3,13
Number of children  0,024  3,94 0,030 8,01Saving rate  -0,270 -1,15
Age 0,003  0,60 0,027 12,30Industry -2,501 -0,9
Age (square)  0,000  -0,39 0,000 -10,80Construction  -0,166 -0,06
North x second. Edu.  -0,216  -3,26 -0,072 -2,08Services -0,425 -0,15
        x univers. Educ.  -0,232  -3,86 -0,037 -1,05Non profit services  6,943 1,61
        x Managers  0,022  0,15 -0,180 -2,28North x second. Edu.  0,206 1,71
        x Professionals  0,213  2,43 -0,216 -4,35        x univers. Educ.  0,135 1,31
        x Clerks  0,167  1,70 -0,089 -1,39East x second. Edu.  0,088 0,86
        x Semi-skilled  0,140  1,55 -0,104 -2,40        x univers. Educ.  0,155 1,75
East x second. Edu.  -0,175  -3,00 -0,056 -2,01South x second. Edu.  0,199 1,99
        x univers. Educ.  -0,229  -4,41 -0,044 -1,52         x univers. Educ.  0,286 3,26
        x Managers  0,067  0,50 -0,142 -2,40Constant term  -3,660 -1,62
        x Professionals  0,096  1,21 -0,142 -3,39  
        x Clerks  0,117  1,30 -0,057 -1,10  
        x Semi-skilled  0,046  0,55 -0,065 -1,71 1 u σ   0,417 35,02
South x second. Edu.  -0,146  -2,60 -0,020 -0,71 2 u σ   0,375 136,75
         x univers. Educ.  -0,089  -1,76 -0,015 -0,50 1 u ε ρ   -0,778 -30,98
         x Managers  -0,420  -3,31 -0,074 -1,15 2 u ε ρ   -0,313 -9,15
         x Professionals  -0,049  -0,65 -0,208 -5,02  
         x Clerks  0,147  1,70 -0,049 -0,95  
         x Semi-skilled  -0,090  -1,13 -0,064 -1,71  
Constant term  7,093  53,71 6,003 117,84  
          
                 
Number of obs =  18201             
Wald chi2(54) =  2108,5             
Prob > chi2 =  0             
Log likelihood    -15.172,51              
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A2.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with 













Table A.2b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, males) 
Regional dummies 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
   Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia  -0.099 -1.31 -0.080 -2.26  -0.235 -0.77 
Aragon -0.134  -1.64  0.035  0.92  0.192  0.48 
Asturias -0.074  -0.85  -0.019  -0.43  0.391  0.96 
Ballearic Islands  -0.063  -0.74  -0.049  -1.2  0.194  0.57 
Canary Islands  -0.054  -0.7  -0.143  -3.89  -0.260  -0.92 
Cantabria -0.105  -1.21  -0.076  -1.79  0.181  0.6 
Castilla y León  0.013  0.17  -0.023  -0.63  -0.110  -0.26 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.103 -1.32 -0.126 -3.36  -0.043 -0.09 
Catalonia  0.069 0.86 0.137 3.72  0.428 0.89 
Comunidad Valenciana  -0.076  -0.94  -0.045  -1.24  0.202  0.63 
Extremadura  -0.295 -3.77 -0.144 -3.75  -0.302 -0.56 
Galicia -0.205  -2.41  -0.172  -4.1  0.080  0.21 
Murcia -0.178  -2.3  -0.186  -5.02  0.132  0.39 
Navarra  0.018 0.22 0.138 3.54  0.519 0.81 
Basque  Country  0.140 1.69 0.206 5.42  0.015 0.03 
La Rioja  -0.148  -1.67  0.020  0.5  0.058  0.1 
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Table A.3a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, females) 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation (public sector) 
    Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat    Coef. t-stat 
           
Secondary Education  0.144  2.23  0.103  3.07  Second. Educ.  0.584  5.05 
University Education  0.407  6.16  0.212  5.60  University Educ.  1.061  9.89 
Permanent Contract  0.198  11.29  0.165  14.03  Married  -0.128  -2.73 
Tenure 0.019  4.76  0.026  8.75  Number of children  0.070  3.81 
Tenure  (square)  -0.001 -3.20 -0.001 -4.54  Age  0.125 10.95 
Managers 0.612  3.41  0.715  5.73  Age  (square)  -0.001  -7.78 
Professionals  0.101  1.19  0.386  9.07  Spouse with University   0.161  3.42 
Clerks  -0.067  -0.77  0.211  4.98  Spouse with Second. Educ.  0.099  1.95 
Semi-skilled workers  0.118  0.82  0.055  1.21  Spouse in the Public S.  0.475  9.77 
Married  0.031 1.86 0.021 1.69  Capital  Income  0.142 3.66 
Number of children  0.002  0.24  0.019  3.06  Saving rate  -0.031  -0.12 
Age  0.022 3.47 0.035  10.29  Industry  0.326 0.08 
Age (square)  0.000  -3.05  0.000  -10.00  Construction  4.549  1.15 
North  x  Second.  Edu.  -0.103 -1.18 -0.016 -0.32  Services  -7.267 -1.74 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.117  -1.41  0.063  1.25  Non profit services  1.979  0.31 
        x Managers  -0.315  -1.30  0.063  0.35  North x Second. Edu.  0.179  1.08 
        x Professionals  0.198  1.81  -0.177  -2.96          x Univers. Educ.  0.162  1.12 
        x Clerks  0.197  1.75  0.021  0.34  East x Second. Edu.  -0.013  -0.10 
        x Semi-skilled  0.070  0.37  0.070  1.15          x Univers. Educ.  0.297  2.47 
East x Second. Edu.  -0.083  -1.11  0.026  0.68  South x Second. Edu.  -0.048  -0.36 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.165  -2.30  0.023  0.55           x Univers. Educ.  0.058  0.48 
        x Managers  -0.094  -0.46  -0.101  -0.74  Constant term  -1.019  -0.31 
        x Professionals  0.249  2.59  -0.229  -4.84        
        x Clerks  0.176  1.78  -0.087  -1.78        
        x Semi-skilled  -0.088  -0.50  -0.038  -0.75  1 u σ   0.326 35.29 
South x Second. Edu.  -0.045  -0.63  -0.055  -1.37  2 u σ   0.381 102.08
         x Univers. Educ.  -0.070  -1.02  0.054  1.24  1 u ε ρ   -0.390 -4.12 
         x Managers  -0.360 -1.70 -0.387 -2.54  2 u ε ρ   -0.273 -6.36 
         x Professionals  0.218  2.37  -0.202  -4.11    
         x Clerks  0.140  1.48  -0.048  -0.95    
         x Semi-skilled  -0.057  -0.34  0.039  0.76    
Constant term  6.339  33.45  5.702  83.98  Number of obs =  10,037 
           Wald chi2(54) =  1,514.97 
           Prob > chi2 =  0    
          Log likelihood    -8,591.4    
                  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A3.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with 
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Table A.3b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, females) 
Regional dummies 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
   Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia  -0.218 -2.98 -0.190 -5.01 -0.447 -0.96 
Aragon -0.179  -2.3  -0.039  -0.94  -1.002  -1.69 
Asturias  -0.158 -1.72 -0.124 -2.39 -0.921 -1.51 
Ballearic Islands  -0.145  -1.72  0.016  0.38  0.704  1.39 
Canary  Islands  -0.114 -1.53 -0.094 -2.43  0.295  0.7 
Cantabria  -0.099 -1.05 -0.292 -5.69 -0.803  -1.8 
Castilla y León  -0.166  -2.22  -0.196  -4.72  -1.072  -1.67 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.183 -2.41 -0.177 -4.06 -0.873 -1.24 
Catalonia -0.130  -1.67  0.074  1.98  -0.858  -1.19 
Comunidad  Valenciana  -0.188 -2.42 -0.066 -1.77 -0.686 -1.44 
Extremadura  -0.351 -4.65 -0.139 -3.02 -0.821  -1 
Galicia -0.173  -1.88  -0.285  -6  -1.085  -1.94 
Murcia  -0.246 -3.2 -0.142 -3.5 -0.931  -1.85 
Navarra -0.120  -1.49  0.101  2.41  -1.617  -1.7 
Basque  Country  0.079 0.97 0.056 1.38 -1.523  -2.06 
La  Rioja  -0.206 -2.49 -0.026 -0.59 -1.628 -1.86 
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Table A.4. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, teaching) 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation (public sector) 
   Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat    Coef.  t-stat
Male -0.009  -0.60 0.116  5.95  Male  -0.097 -2.09
Secondary Education  0.168  3.65  0.170  5.44  Secondary Education  0.554  5.98 
University Education  0.441  8.21  0.270  6.15  University education  1.277  14.92
Permanent contract  0.216  8.20  0.184  6.69  Married  -0.151 -1.96
Tenure 0.012  2.40  0.017  2.91  Number of children  0.041  1.63 
Tenure squared  0.000  -1.71 0.000  -0.32  Age  0.028  9.91 
Married  0.055  2.54  0.039  1.47  Spouse with University   0.166  2.44 
Number of children  0.002  0.25  0.046  4.08  Spouse with Second. Educ.  0.053  0.70 
Age  0.011  8.58  0.008  5.23  Spouse in the Public S.  0.486  7.17 
Andalusía 0.003  0.09  -0.266  -7.17  Capital  Income  -0.053 -0.89
Aragón 0.081  2.05  -0.155  -3.46  Saving  rate  0.307  0.66 
Asturias 0.198  4.32  -0.111  -1.54  Manufacturing  4.963  0.77 
Ballearic Islands  0.027  0.54  -0.301  -4.97  Construction  0.030  0.00 
Canary Islands  0.136  3.71  -0.166  -3.32  Market services  -3.606 -0.57
Cantabria 0.114  2.46  -0.195  -3.39  Non-market services  -3.378 -0.33
Castilla and León  0.148  3.60  -0.159  -2.66  Andalusia  0.406  0.58 
Castilla-La Mancha  0.065  1.66  -0.420  -7.68  Aragón  -1.020 -1.14
Catalonia 0.016  0.52  -0.022  -0.72  Asturias  -0.358 -0.39
Valencia -0.083  -2.47 -0.134  -3.17  Ballearic  Islands 0.887  1.20 
Extremadura -0.011  -0.27 -0.161  -2.84  Canary  Islands  1.080  1.66 
Galicia 0.005  0.15  -0.264  -5.47  Cantabria  -0.573 -0.86
Murcia  0.032  0.73  -0.317  -5.03  Castilla and León  -0.276 -0.29
Navarra 0.041  0.96  -0.179  -3.15  Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.069 -0.06
Basque Country  0.210  5.00  -0.052  -1.27  Catalonia  -1.109 -0.99
La Rioja  -0.117  -2.09 -0.293  -4.88  Valencia  -0.269 -0.37
Constant term  6.400  56.16 6.318  96.01  Extremadura  0.339  0.27 
           Galicia  -0.229 -0.27
           Murcia  -0.024 -0.03
           Navarra -1.447 -1.00
Number of obs =  3,777        Basque Country  -1.315 -1.17
Wald chi2 =  603.94        La Rioja  -1.437 -1.08
Prob > chi2 =  0        Constant term  -0.655 -0.13
Log likelihood    -3,489.05              
                  
            1 u σ   0.302 52.20
            2 u σ   0.400 37.91
            1 u ε ρ   -0.136 -1.06
            2 u ε ρ   -0.317 -2.72
                     
 
Notes: Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single and 
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Table A.5. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, health and social services) 
 
   Public sector  Private sector  Selection equation (public sector) 
    Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat    Coef. t-stat
Male  0.160 5.26  0,150 4.05  Male  -0.926-14.26
Secondary  Education  0.085 0.73  0,255 2.04  Secondary  education  -0.478 -1.46
University  Education  0.387 4.61  0,356 3.23  Tertiary  education  -0.067 -0.25
Permanent contract  0.109  3.9  0,150  4.25  Married  -0.111 -1.02
Tenure  0.023 3.46  0,025 2.98  Number of children  -0.019 -0.53
Tenure squared  -0.001  -3.4  -0,001  -2.65  Age  0.128 5.33
Married 0.026  0.94  0,051  1.4  Age  squared  -0.001 -3.57
Number of children  0.005  0.51  0,058  3.46  Spouse with University Educ.  0.350 3.59
Age  0.045  4.73  0,030  2.7  Spouse with Second. Educ.  0.106 1.01
Age squared  0.000  -4.52 0,000  -1.28  Spouse in the Public S.  0.383 4.34
North -0.014  -0.1  -0,810  1.03  Capital  Income  0.008 0.10
North X Second. Educ.  -0.094  -0.51 -0,547  -3.91  Saving rate  -0.313 -0.58
North x Univers. Educ.  -0.209  -1.44 0,168  -3.2  Manufacturing  3.604 1.91
East -0.041  -0.13 -0,145  -0.09  Construction  6.786 1.43
East x secondary studies  0.082  0.24  -0,065  -0.96  Market services  4.509 2.91
East x tertiary studies  -0.077  -0.24 -0,012  -0.5  Non-market services  1.279 4.17
South -0.111  -0.69 -0,298  -1.27  North 0.065 0.15
South x secondary studies  0.046  0.23  -0,025  -1.92  North X Second. Educ.  0.659 1.25
South x tertiary studies  -0.040  -0.24 -0,162  -0.18  North x Univers. Educ.  0.683 1.61
Constant term  6.017  25.63 5,864  25.54  East  -1.912 -3.47
           East x Secondary Education  2.725 4.52
           East x University Education  2.553 4.59
           South  -1.073 -2.76
Number of obs =  2,305        South x Secondary Educ.  1.250 2.70
Wald chi2 =  499.57        South x Univers. Educ.  1.671 4.37
Prob > chi2 =  0        Constant term  -8.978 -4.95
Log likelihood    -2,079.27              
                  
            1 u σ   0.302 33.78
            2 u σ   0.410 41.16
            1 u ε ρ   -0.249 -1.60
            2 u ε ρ   -0.229 -2.18
                     
 
Notes: Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single and 
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Appendix B: Further results 
Table B1.a. Random effects GLS regressions 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
                    
Variables Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
                    
Public Sector  0.144  20.66         
Male  0.194 23.51 0.075  4.93 0.237 25.77 
Secondary  Education  0.116 6.38 0.092 2.27 0.125 6.18 
University  Education  0.219  10.22 0.219 5.34 0.219 8.87 
Permanent  Contract  0.088 17.10 0.122 10.74 0.082 14.05 
Tenure  0.018 13.27 0.018  6.80 0.018 11.44 
Tenure  (square)  -0.001 -8.65  0.000 -3.89 -0.001 -7.64 
Managers  0.329 8.36 0.279 3.11 0.375 8.43 
Professionals  0.200 7.97 0.164 2.89 0.217 7.64 
Clerks  0.146 5.24 0.099 1.59 0.162 5.15 
Semi-skilled  workers  0.058 2.35 0.041 0.64 0.065 2.40 
Married  0.042 5.12 0.084 5.51 0.029 3.14 
Age  0.045 20.60 0.028  6.07 0.045 18.54 
Age  (square)  0.000 -17.29 0.000  -4.41 0.000 -15.98 
Number  of  children  0.006 1.69 -0.004  -0.69  0.012 2.88 
North x Second. Educ.  -0.036  -1.42  -0.007  -0.13  -0.062  -2.17 
        x Univers. Educ.  0.014  0.47  0.045  0.82  -0.040  -1.15 
        x Managers  -0.046  -0.78 -0.049 -0.42 -0.028 -0.40 
        x Professionals  -0.068 -2.05 -0.022 -0.31 -0.126 -3.30 
        x Clerks  -0.027  -0.71 -0.043 -0.54 -0.025 -0.55 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.021  -0.69  -0.019  -0.24  -0.020  -0.58 
East x Second. Educ.  -0.037  -1.81  -0.009  -0.19  -0.053  -2.32 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.039 -1.62 -0.030 -0.64 -0.054 -1.94 
        x Managers  -0.078  -1.74  0.083  0.78  -0.122  -2.42 
        x Professionals  -0.077  -2.77  0.061  0.94  -0.108  -3.43 
        x Clerks  -0.044  -1.41  0.004  0.05  -0.046  -1.30 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.015  -0.55  -0.007  -0.09  -0.024  -0.81 
South x Second. Educ.  -0.023  -1.12  0.029  0.66  -0.044  -1.88 
         x Univers. Educ.  0.027  1.10  0.084  1.82  -0.020  -0.69 
         x Managers  -0.125 -2.59 -0.230 -2.20 -0.112 -2.03 
         x Professionals  -0.081 -2.90 -0.019 -0.31 -0.133 -4.17 
         x Clerks  -0.041  -1.31 -0.003 -0.04 -0.049 -1.37 
         x Semi-skilled  -0.026  -0.97  -0.021  -0.31  -0.030  -1.01 
Constant  term  5.590 120.28 6.079  57.13 5.577 108.91 
u σ   0.305  0.288  0.306  
  ρ  (fraction of variance due to u)  0.667  0.735  0.649  
R
2:  overall  0.511  0.491  0.450  
No. observations  28,238   6,925   21,313  
No. groups  8,135  2,048  6,740  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B1.b) included.  The constant term represents a worker with 
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Table B1.a. Random effects GLS regressions. 
Regional dummies 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
 Coefficient  t-Stat.  Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
Andalusia -0.153  -5.46  -0.171  -2.66  -0.153  -4.99 
Aragon -0.029  -0.9  -0.161  -2.23  -0.014  -0.38 
Asturias -0.100  -2.73  -0.096  -1.24  -0.084  -2.07 
Ballearic Islands  -0.042  -1.2  -0.095  -1.19  -0.036  -0.96 
Canary Islands  -0.141  -4.72  -0.126  -1.89  -0.147  -4.5 
Cantabria -0.144  -4.03  -0.035  -0.44  -0.165  -4.19 
Castilla y León  -0.086  -2.77  -0.102  -1.48  -0.091  -2.64 
Castilla-La Mancha  -0.162  -5.07  -0.196  -2.82  -0.166  -4.7 
Catalonia 0.058  2  -0.081  -1.18  0.093  2.96 
Comunidad Valenciana  -0.122  -4.18  -0.200  -2.84  -0.114  -3.61 
Extremadura -0.202  -6.09  -0.341  -5.03  -0.166  -4.43 
Galicia -0.241  -7.25  -0.169  -2.24  -0.251  -6.88 
Murcia -0.197  -6.21  -0.223  -3.19  -0.184  -5.3 
Navarra 0.066  1.98  -0.063  -0.84  0.085  2.33 
Basque Country  0.092  2.9  0.046  0.61  0.111  3.23 
La Rioja  -0.057  -1.6  -0.225  -2.74  -0.024  -0.63 
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Table B2.a. Quartile regressions (25th quartile) 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
                    
Variables Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
                    
Public Sector  0.225  30.87         
Male 0.173  29.00  0.072  6.52  0.221  25.76 
Secondary Education  0.165  7.79  0.165  3.50  0.166  5.75 
University Education  0.306  13.31  0.412  9.16  0.240  7.39 
Permanent Contract  0.148  19.21  0.227  13.18  0.133  12.65 
Tenure 0.019  10.41  0.021  5.58  0.017  6.75 
Tenure (square)  0.000  -5.03  -0.001  -3.45  0.000  -3.17 
Managers 0.680  13.57  0.792  6.65  0.699  10.40 
Professionals 0.204  6.69  0.223  3.16  0.241  5.79 
Clerks 0.110  3.40  0.029  0.38  0.181  4.11 
Semi-skilled workers  0.104  3.60  0.197  2.47  0.082  2.15 
Married 0.038  4.85  0.056  3.71  0.032  2.87 
Age 0.031  16.40  0.026  6.03  0.035  13.20 
Age  (square)  0.000 -14.30 0.000 -4.94 0.000 -11.85 
Number of children  0.022  6.95  0.017  3.11  0.021  4.46 
North x Second. Educ.  -0.090  -3.04  -0.100  -1.56  -0.120  -2.94 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.006  -0.20  -0.125  -2.03  0.013  0.30 
        x Managers  -0.211  -2.81 -0.198 -1.23  -0.207 -1.98 
        x Professionals  0.002  0.05  0.141  1.57  -0.146  -2.60 
        x Clerks  0.046  1.04  0.135  1.42  0.012  0.19 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.038  -1.03  -0.033  -0.33  -0.013  -0.27 
East x Second. Educ.  -0.072  -2.99  -0.047  -0.84  -0.084  -2.56 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.059 -2.26 -0.110 -2.10 -0.040 -1.08 
        x Managers  -0.166  -2.91 -0.194 -1.35  -0.208 -2.74 
        x Professionals  -0.029  -0.86  0.090  1.12  -0.117  -2.52 
        x Clerks  -0.008  -0.21  0.037  0.43  -0.030  -0.61 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.010  -0.31  -0.034  -0.38  -0.018  -0.42 
South x Second. Educ.  -0.071  -2.89  -0.053  -1.00  -0.081  -2.40 
         x Univers. Educ.  0.032  1.21  -0.037  -0.73  0.024  0.64 
         x Managers  -0.325 -5.29 -0.459 -3.33 -0.262 -3.12 
         x Professionals  -0.038  -1.11  0.020  0.26  -0.142  -3.03 
         x Clerks  0.027  0.73  0.095  1.17  0.014  0.27 
         x Semi-skilled  -0.016  -0.51  -0.173  -2.03  0.015  0.37 
Constant  term  5.542 129.94 5.674 52.95 5.504 94.37 
            
Num. Obs  28,238   6,925   21,313  
Pseudo R2  0.292  0.332  0.229  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B2.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with  
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Table B2.b. Quartile regressions (25th quartile) 
Regional dummies 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
 Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia  -0.113 -4.07 -0.036 -0.51 -0.137  -3.7 
Aragon -0.006  -0.2  -0.069  -0.92  0.023  0.57 
Asturias  -0.084  -2.4  -0.060 -0.72 -0.100 -2.08 
Ballearic Islands  -0.003  -0.09  -0.016  -0.2  0.016  0.38 
Canary  Islands  -0.131 -4.57 -0.023 -0.33 -0.151 -3.95 
Cantabria  -0.180 -5.25 -0.071 -0.87 -0.184 -3.98 
Castilla  y  León  -0.095 -3.28 -0.010 -0.14 -0.122 -3.11 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.117 -3.97 -0.013 -0.19 -0.157 -3.91 
Catalonia 0.059  2.06  -0.032  -0.44  0.091  2.4 
Comunidad  Valenciana  -0.065 -2.29 -0.077 -1.04 -0.052 -1.38 
Extremadura  -0.179 -5.95 -0.177 -2.48 -0.147 -3.55 
Galicia  -0.212 -6.3 -0.138 -1.7 -0.224  -4.95 
Murcia  -0.204 -7.03 -0.168 -2.35 -0.202 -5.17 
Navarra 0.135  4.41  0.065  0.86  0.189  4.61 
Basque Country  0.153  5.09  0.118  1.53  0.167  4.19 
La  Rioja  -0.061 -1.95 -0.234 -2.96 -0.014 -0.33 
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Table B3.a. Quartile regressions (50th quartile) 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
                    
Variables Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
                    
Public Sector  0.176  25.33         
Male 0.181  31.05  0.066  6.24  0.227  38.90 
Secondary Education  0.120  5.78  0.215  4.59  0.106  5.42 
University Education  0.310  14.46  0.490  11.08  0.235  11.15 
Permanent Contract  0.114  15.60  0.190  11.42  0.104  15.04 
Tenure 0.020  11.32  0.020  5.57  0.018  10.24 
Tenure (square)  0.000  -4.74  -0.001  -3.79  0.000  -3.33 
Managers 0.755  15.46  0.720  6.13  0.831  18.30 
Professionals 0.309  10.57  0.235  3.38  0.370  13.35 
Clerks 0.148  4.60  -0.002  -0.03  0.203  6.65 
Semi-skilled workers  0.132  4.62  0.175  2.25  0.131  5.01 
Married 0.038  4.92  0.057  3.81  0.042  5.57 
Age 0.031  16.84  0.025  6.03  0.033  18.43 
Age (square)  0.000  -14.43  0.000  -4.64  0.000  -16.31 
Number of children  0.017  5.33  0.019  3.44  0.016  4.93 
North x Second. Educ.  -0.011  -0.37  -0.144  -2.32  -0.025  -0.88 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.001  -0.03  -0.201  -3.44  0.035  1.22 
        x Managers  -0.269  -3.68 -0.194 -1.25  -0.301 -4.26 
        x Professionals  -0.053  -1.38  0.167  1.92  -0.265  -7.03 
        x Clerks  -0.020  -0.46  0.105  1.11  -0.023  -0.52 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.066  -1.81  0.019  0.20  -0.089  -2.64 
East x Second. Educ.  -0.032  -1.34  -0.135  -2.46  -0.023  -1.04 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.040 -1.66 -0.208 -4.09 -0.002 -0.08 
        x Managers  -0.176  -3.16 -0.131 -0.94  -0.251 -4.88 
        x Professionals  -0.104  -3.20  0.129  1.64  -0.190  -6.15 
        x Clerks  -0.037  -1.00  0.068  0.81  -0.036  -1.05 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.063  -2.02  -0.050  -0.57  -0.088  -3.09 
South x Second. Educ.  -0.019  -0.78  -0.084  -1.60  -0.012  -0.54 
         x Univers. Educ.  0.055  2.23  -0.058  -1.17  0.060  2.43 
         x Managers  -0.286 -4.77 -0.467 -3.46 -0.249 -4.38 
         x Professionals  -0.120  -3.70  0.039  0.52  -0.236  -7.56 
         x Clerks  -0.051  -1.38  0.100  1.23  -0.053  -1.50 
         x Semi-skilled  -0.060  -1.94  -0.140  -1.67  -0.062  -2.19 
Constant term  5.741  137.54  5.889  57.02  5.731  145.15 
            
Num. Obs  28,238   6,925   21,313  
Pseudo R2  0.336  0.349  0.270  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B3.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with  
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Table B3.b. Quartile regressions (50th quartile). 
Regional dummies 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
 Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia  -0.089 -3.25 -0.056 -0.83 -0.099 -3.88 
Aragon  -0.022 -0.74 -0.060 -0.83 -0.005 -0.19 
Asturias -0.055  -1.6  0.002  0.03  -0.034  -1.03 
Ballearic  Islands  -0.020 -0.65 -0.016 -0.21 -0.012  -0.4 
Canary  Islands  -0.127 -4.49 -0.030 -0.43 -0.142 -5.38 
Cantabria  -0.139 -4.09 -0.011 -0.14 -0.128 -4.02 
Castilla y León  -0.066  -2.31  -0.013  -0.19  -0.061  -2.26 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.103 -3.53 -0.023 -0.32 -0.122 -4.42 
Catalonia 0.066  2.36  -0.005  -0.07  0.097  3.72 
Comunidad  Valenciana  -0.061 -2.18 -0.053 -0.73 -0.056 -2.17 
Extremadura  -0.151 -5.07 -0.185 -2.67 -0.130 -4.55 
Galicia  -0.209 -6.29 -0.113 -1.42 -0.208  -6.7 
Murcia  -0.174 -6.07 -0.135 -1.94 -0.179 -6.64 
Navarra  0.117 3.88 0.038 0.52 0.160 5.68 
Basque  Country  0.141 4.77 0.148 1.98 0.161 5.88 
La  Rioja  -0.031 -0.98 -0.130 -1.67 0.013  0.43 
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Table B4.a. Quartile regressions (75th quartile) 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
                    
Variables Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
                    
Public Sector  0.116  16.14         
Male 0.181  30.21  0.058  5.52  0.230  29.51 
Secondary Education  0.133  6.18  0.193  4.02  0.110  4.24 
University Education  0.338  15.73  0.453  10.03  0.305  11.29 
Permanent Contract  0.118  15.97  0.143  8.42  0.108  12.19 
Tenure 0.020  11.01  0.019  5.25  0.019  8.68 
Tenure (square)  0.000  -4.31  -0.001  -3.69  0.000  -2.51 
Managers 0.787  15.45  0.613  5.26  0.830  13.79 
Professionals 0.383  12.90  0.272  3.94  0.439  12.17 
Clerks 0.204  6.06  0.048  0.63  0.275  6.76 
Semi-skilled workers  0.094  3.16  0.110  1.42  0.078  2.24 
Married 0.046  5.65  0.046  2.98  0.047  4.63 
Age 0.027  14.22  0.022  5.46  0.027  11.58 
Age (square)  0.000  -11.69  0.000  -3.54  0.000  -9.83 
Number of children  0.020  6.00  0.007  1.30  0.026  6.14 
North x Second. Educ.  -0.009  -0.30  -0.125  -1.98  0.001  0.02 
        x Univers. Educ.  0.002  0.06  -0.200  -3.49  -0.006  -0.16 
        x Managers  -0.144  -1.89  0.014  0.09  -0.133  -1.42 
        x Professionals  -0.029  -0.75  0.262  3.05  -0.232  -4.74 
        x Clerks  -0.080  -1.71  0.093  0.97  -0.108  -1.82 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.027  -0.72  0.183  1.91  -0.042  -0.93 
East x Second. Educ.  -0.051  -2.08  -0.136  -2.41  -0.034  -1.15 
        x Univers. Educ.  -0.040 -1.64 -0.179 -3.48 -0.033 -1.10 
        x Managers  -0.082  -1.41  0.044  0.31  -0.160  -2.35 
        x Professionals  -0.114  -3.45  0.185  2.38  -0.211  -5.25 
        x Clerks  -0.042  -1.11  0.094  1.09  -0.084  -1.80 
        x Semi-skilled  -0.016  -0.48  0.085  0.96  -0.028  -0.74 
South x Second. Educ.  -0.028  -1.14  -0.060  -1.11  -0.023  -0.76 
         x Univers. Educ.  0.080  3.27  0.025  0.50  0.046  1.46 
         x Managers  -0.223 -3.56 -0.353 -2.63 -0.206 -2.73 
         x Professionals  -0.146  -4.48  0.012  0.16  -0.276  -6.84 
         x Clerks  -0.104  -2.71  0.017  0.20  -0.101  -2.13 
         x Semi-skilled  -0.027  -0.83  -0.020  -0.24  -0.020  -0.52 
Constant term  6.013  139.07  6.190  60.01  6.022  116.05 
            
Num. Obs  28,238   6,925   21,313  
Pseudo R2  0.377  0.339  0.333  
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B4.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with  
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Table B4.b. Quartile regressions (75th quartile) 
Regional dummies 
 
  FULL SAMPLE  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE  SECTOR 
 Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia -0.093  -3.25  -0.115  -1.7  -0.096  -2.84 
Aragon  -0.052 -1.68 -0.173 -2.39 -0.034 -0.92 
Asturias  -0.030 -0.84 -0.114 -1.41 -0.031 -0.71 
Ballearic  Islands  -0.080 -2.43 -0.156 -2.05 -0.075 -1.94 
Canary  Islands  -0.103 -3.49 -0.045 -0.65 -0.134 -3.81 
Cantabria  -0.114 -3.19 -0.130 -1.61 -0.118 -2.77 
Castilla and León  -0.059  -1.96  -0.095 -1.37 -0.056 -1.56 
Castilla-La  Mancha  -0.115 -3.75 -0.104 -1.49 -0.124 -3.37 
Catalonia 0.063  2.13  -0.095  -1.33  0.086  2.5 
Comunidad  Valenciana  -0.095 -3.26 -0.186 -2.59 -0.086  -2.5 
Extremadura  -0.165 -5.33 -0.225 -3.26 -0.135 -3.57 
Galicia  -0.208 -5.96 -0.143 -1.81 -0.215 -5.15 
Murcia  -0.169 -5.64 -0.146 -2.09 -0.177 -4.96 
Navarra 0.074  2.36  -0.044  -0.6  0.088  2.34 
Basque  Country  0.124 4.04 0.026 0.35 0.135 3.72 
La  Rioja  -0.050 -1.54 -0.236 -3.06 -0.016 -0.42 
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http://www.upo.es/econ Figure 2. Unadjusted public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions 
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Figure 6. Proportion of public employment at regional governments  
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Figure 8. Unemployment rates and public sector wage gaps 
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